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The US’s Indo-Pacific Strategy: Implications for Pacific 
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Denghua Zhang
The Indo-Pacific strategy is the Trump administration’s new 
policy on the region. Though its details remain unclear, this In 
Brief discusses the strategy’s nature and its implications for 
Pacific Island countries (PICs).  
Indo-Pacific strategy
The Indo-Pacific strategy replaces the Obama administration’s 
‘pivot to Asia’ policy.1  The US government defines Indo-Pacific 
as a region that stretches from the US’s west coast to India’s 
west coast (White House 2017:45–46). The ‘free and open 
Indo-Pacific’ strategy was first outlined by President Trump 
at the APEC CEO Summit in Vietnam in November 2017. He 
envisioned that nations in the region would prosper and thrive 
in freedom and peace on the premise that all of them played 
by the international rules. China, though not named in Trump’s 
remarks, was undoubtedly a major target, as it has been 
accused of using government-run industrial planning and state-
owned enterprises as well as chronic trade abuses including 
product dumping, subsidised goods, currency manipulation 
and predatory industrial policies. 
Senior US officials such as Alex Wong, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of the State Department, and Secretary of State 
Michael Pompeo clarified the Indo-Pacific strategy in April and 
July 2018, respectively. By ‘free’ the US means that nations 
should be free from coercion by other countries internationally 
and be free of corruption, have good governance, fundamental 
rights and transparency domestically. By ‘open’ it means more 
open airways, sea lines of communication, logistics infrastructure, 
investment and trade (Wong 2018; Pompeo 2018). 
The Indo-Pacific strategy is largely designed to curb China’s 
growing influence. The Trump administration is abandoning the 
US’s two-decade policy of engagement with China and taking 
a hardline position. As the US National Security Strategy and 
National Defense Strategy articulate, ‘the assumption that 
engagement with rivals and their inclusion in international 
institutions and global commerce would turn them into benign 
actors and trustworthy partners … turned out to be false’ (The 
White House 2017:3) and ‘long-term strategic competitions with 
China and Russia are the principal priorities for the Department’ 
(US Department of Defense 2018:4). The recent trade war and 
shadow-boxing in the South China Sea are two examples of 
heightened tensions between the US and China that are deeply 
rooted in their distinctive ideologies and ensuing strategic distrust. 
Another intention of the strategy is to leverage the 
weight of India. In contrast to previous US policies on the 
Asia-Pacific region, the Indo-Pacific strategy puts India at 
its heart and underlines the significant role the US expects 
India to play in the battle against China’s growing influence. 
US policymakers believe that enhancing cooperation with India 
— the world’s largest like-minded democracy, second-largest 
population and sixth-largest economy — is in the US’s national 
interest (Wong 2018). Yet India’s willingness to be locked into 
this strategy remains in doubt.
Implications  
The implications of the Indo-Pacific strategy for the Pacific region 
will ultimately be determined by its implementation. As this has yet 
to be tested, for now we can only offer a few predictions. Firstly, 
Asian countries have more weight than Pacific Island states 
in US diplomacy and will therefore dominate the Indo-Pacific 
strategy. Secondly, northern Pacific states will attract more 
attention from the US government than those in the South 
Pacific. For historical and strategic reasons, the US has 
predominance in the northern Pacific under the Compact 
of Free Association with the Marshall Islands, the Federat-
ed States of Micronesia (FSM) and Palau, which will expire 
in 2023. In the context of current debates about US–FSM 
Compact renegotiation and the bid of Chuuk, one of FSM’s 
four districts, to secede from FSM,2 it is expected that the 
US will maintain its presence in northern Pacific. Both issues 
have strong China-related dimensions. Given FSM’s strategic 
location near the critical sea line of communication and along 
China’s Second Island Chain, ending the Compact with FSM 
or Chuuk would risk reducing the US’s capacity and influence 
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in the region. Washington will continue to rely more on Australia 
and New Zealand to provide aid to South Pacific states.  
Thirdly, the Trump administration has shown less interest in 
grant aid than loans and has proposed to cut the US aid budget. 
However, the cuts are unlikely to be passed by Congress, which 
can see the value of US aid programs in contending with China’s 
rising influence in developing countries. Lastly, to compete with 
China’s fast-growing loan schemes, Washington is pledging more 
support for infrastructure development in the Indo-Pacific region 
(Pompeo 2018). Chinese foreign lending in the form of conces-
sional and commercial loans has increased rapidly in the past 
decade. The difficulties some recipient countries, including those 
in the Pacific, may have in repaying Chinese loans breed concerns 
of debts-for-equity swaps, which the US government argues will 
compromise the countries’ sovereignty (Wong 2018). In response, 
Washington is calling for the US private sector to play an active 
role in implementing the Indo-Pacific strategy, especially the 
infrastructure sector. 
A telling sign of new US–China competition is that the 
US government is increasing the role of the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation (OPIC), the development finance 
institution that provides loans, political risk insurance and 
support for private equity funds. The US Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations passed the BUILD (Better Utilization of 
Investment Leading to Development) Act in June 2018, which 
aims to merge OPIC and USAID’s Development Credit Authority 
and expand the US development financing capacities to US$60 
billion. The revamped agency will enable the US to better 
‘compete with countries like China by providing an alternative 
to state-directed investment in emerging markets’, as OPIC 
President and CEO Ray Washburne said. The bill was signed 
into law by President Trump in early October 2018.
Infrastructure is also one of the three priority sectors (along 
with the digital economy and energy) that will benefit from an 
initiative seeded with US$113 million that Secretary Pompeo 
announced in July 2018 (Pompeo 2018). According to Pompeo, 
the US is committed to promoting infrastructure that is ‘phys-
ically secure, financially viable and socially responsible’ (ibid.), 
distinguishing it from Beijing’s offering. 
The US’s renewed interest in the Pacific is a mixed bless-
ing for PICs. US resources can be conducive to their economic 
and social development, as they rely heavily on external assis-
tance. Despite this, the Indo-Pacific policy is largely strategi-
cally motivated to respond to China’s rise. Notably, China has 
made considerable political and economic investment in the 
Pacific region since 2006 and consolidated its position as a 
major external power. The Chinese premier and president paid 
their first-ever visits to the region in 2006 and 2014, respec-
tively. Since 2011, China has been the second-largest donor in 
the region based on aid commitment behind Australia. In the field 
of infrastructure, Pacific states may have to choose between US 
financing that highlights high quality with strings attached and 
Chinese financing that offers something more responsive and 
cost-effective. 
In response to growing external influence, Pacific leaders 
have demonstrated commitment to determining their own devel-
opment agenda. The 2017 Pacific Islands Forum endorsed the 
‘Blue Pacific’ identity. As Dame Meg Taylor, Secretary General of 
the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, said, the core of the Blue 
Pacific identity is the collective empowerment of Pacific people 
to take greater control of regional development. How to deal 
with US–China competition in the region will be a test of Pacific 
leaders’ wisdom and capacity to act collectively as a community.
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Endnotes
1. President Trump also withdrew from the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership.
2. This point was kindly suggested by an anonymous reviewer.
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